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Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer
and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity
AVIAD RUBINSTEIN1, UC Berkeley
S. MATTHEW WEINBERG2, Princeton University
We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer
whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D. We show that
if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each
item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue
of the optimal mechanism. This includes buyers who are k-demand, additive up to a matroid constraint,
or additive up to constraints of any downwards-closed set system (and whose values for the individual
items are sampled independently), as well as buyers who are fractionally subadditive with item multipliers
drawn independently. Our proof makes use of the core-tail decomposition framework developed in prior work
showing similar results for the significantly simpler class of additive buyers [Li and Yao 2013; Babaioff et al.
2014].
In the second part of the paper, we develop a connection between approximately optimal simple mecha-
nisms and approximate revenue monotonicity with respect to buyers’ valuations. Revenue non-monotonicity
is the phenomenon that sometimes strictly increasing buyers’ values for every set can strictly decrease the
revenue of the optimal mechanism [Hart and Reny 2012]. Using our main result, we derive a bound on how
bad this degradation can be (and dub such a bound a proof of approximate revenue monotonicity); we further
show that better bounds on approximate monotonicity imply a better analysis of our simple mechanisms.
CCS Concepts: •Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design; Algo-
rithmic mechanism design; Computational pricing and auctions;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Revenue optimization, combinatorial valuations, simple auctions, rev-
enue monotonicity
1. INTRODUCTION
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a sin-
gle buyer whose value for sets of items is unknown, but drawn from a known dis-
tribution D. When n = 1, seminal work of Myerson [Myerson 1981] and Riley and
Zeckhauser [Riley and Zeckhauser 1983] shows that the optimal selling scheme sim-
ply sets the price p∗ = argmax{p · Pr[v ≥ p|v ← D]}. Thirty years later, under-
standing the structure of the optimal mechanism when n > 1 still remains a cen-
tral open problem. Unfortunately, it is well-known that the optimal mechanism may
require randomization, behave non-monotonically, and be computationally hard to
find, even in very simple instances [Thanassoulis 2004; Pavlov 2011; Briest et al.
2010; Daskalakis et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2014; Hart and Nisan 2013; Hart and Reny
2012; Papadimitriou et al. 2016]. In light of this, recent work began studying the per-
formance of especially simple auctions through the lens of approximation. Remark-
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ably, these works have shown that when the bidder’s valuation is additive1, and her
value for each item is drawn independently, very simple mechanisms can achieve
quite good approximation ratios. Specifically, techniques developed in this series of
works proves that the better of setting Myerson’s reserve on each item separately
or setting Myerson’s reserve on the grand bundle of all items together achieves a 6-
approximation [Hart and Nisan 2012; Li and Yao 2013; Babaioff et al. 2014].
While this model of buyer values is certainly mathematically interesting and eco-
nomically motivated, it is also perhaps too simplistic to have broad real-world appli-
cations. A central question left open by these works is whether or not simple mech-
anisms can still approximate optimal ones in more general settings. In this work we
resolve this question in the affirmative, showing that the better of selling separately
(we will henceforth use SREV to denote the revenue of the optimal such mechanism)
or together (henceforth BREV) still obtains a constant-factor approximation to the op-
timal revenue (henceforth REV) when buyer values are combinatorial in nature but
complement-free.
INFORMAL THEOREM 1. Let D be any distribution over subadditive valuation
functions with independent items. Then max{SREV,BREV} ≥ Ω(1) ·REV. Furthermore,
prices providing this guarantee can be found computationally efficiently.
We postpone a formal definition of exactly what it means forD to have “independent
items” to Section 2. We note here a few instantiations of ourmodel in commonly studied
settings (from least to most general):
— k-demand: The buyer has value vi for item i, and the vis are drawn independently.
The buyer’s value for a set S is v(S) = maxT⊆S,|T |≤k{
∑
i∈T vi}.
—Additive up to constraints I: I is some downwards-closed set system on [n]. The
buyer has value vi for item i, and the vis are drawn independently. v(S) =
maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
i∈T vi}.
—Fractionally-subadditive: buyer has “possible values” {vij}j for item i, and the sets
{vij}j are drawn independently across items (but may be correlated within an item).
v(S) = maxj{
∑
i∈S vij}.
A recent book of Hartline [Hartline 2011] provides a fantastic discussion of the role
of approximation in mechanism design. Before proceeding, it is worth repeating some
aspects of this discussion to view our result in the proper context. One should not
interpret our main result as claiming that sellers should be satisfied with a constant
fraction of the optimal obtainable revenue, but rather as studying the tradeoff between
simplicity and optimality. Sometimes, the optimal mechanism simply isn’t an option:
perhaps it is prohibitively complex to implement, prohibitively frustrating for buyers
to participate, or prohibitively difficult (computationally) to find. And even when the
optimal mechanism is a feasible option, the desire for simplicity and transparency may
outweigh the expected loss in revenue. Similarly, one should not interpret the ratios
obtained in our main result (they are noticeably larger than 6) as ratios that one might
expect to trade off in practice, as these are provable bounds for worst-case instances.
1.1. Challenges of Combinatorial Valuations
The design of simple, approximately optimal mechanisms for any non-trivial multi-
item setting has been a large focus for much of the Algorithmic Game Theory
community over the past decade. Even “simple” settings with additive or unit-
demand valuations required significant breakthroughs. The key insight enabling these
1A valuation function v(·) is additive if v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) for all S ∩ T = ∅.
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breakthroughs for additive buyers is that the buyer’s valuation is separable across
items. While the optimal mechanism can still be quite bizarre despite this realiza-
tion [Hart and Reny 2012], this fact enables certain elementary decomposition theo-
rems that are surprisingly powerful (e.g. the “Marginal Mechanism” [Cai and Huang
2013; Hart and Nisan 2012]). However, these theorems are extremely sensitive to be-
ing able to separate the marginal contribution of different items exactly (and not just
via upper/lower bounds). This is due to the phenomenon that a slight miscalculation
in estimating a buyer’s value may cause her to change preferences entirely, resulting
in a potentially unbounded loss of revenue. One of our main technical contributions is
overcoming this obstacle by providing an approximate version of these decomposition
theorems.
A further complication in applying these previous techniques is that they all make
use of the fact that SREV(D1 × . . . × Dn) =
∑
i SREV(Di). This claim is not even ap-
proximately true for subadditive buyers, and the ratio between the two values could
be as large as n (the right-hand side is always larger). To have any hope of applying
these tools, we therefore need a proxy for SREV that at least approximately has this
separability property.
For unit-demand buyers, the key insight behind the mechanisms designed
in [Chawla et al. 2007, 2010a,b; Kleinberg and Weinberg 2012] is that every multi-
dimensional problem instance has a related single-dimensional problem instance, and
there is a correspondence between truthful mechanisms in the two instances. This re-
alization means that one can instead design mechanisms for the single-dimensional
setting, where optimal mechanisms are well understood due to Myerson’s virtual val-
ues, and translate them in a black-box manner to mechanisms for the original instance.
While these techniques have proven extremely fruitful in the design of mechanisms for
multiple unit-demand buyers and sophisticated feasibility constraints, they have also
proven to be limited in use to unit-demand settings. A special case of our results can be
seen as providing an alternative proof of the single-buyer result of Chawla, Hartline,
and Kleinberg [Chawla et al. 2007] (albeit with a significantly worse constant) that
doesn’t require virtual valuation machinery.
Aside from the difficulties in applying existing machinery to design optimal mech-
anisms for combinatorial valuations, formal barriers exist as well. For instance, it is
a trivial procedure for an additive buyer to select his utility-maximizing set of items
when facing an item-pricing, and finding the revenue-optimal item-pricing is also triv-
ial (just find the optimal price for each item separately). Yet for a subadditive buyer,
both tasks are quite non-trivial. Just computing the expected revenue obtained by a
fixed item-pricing is NP-hard. Worse, the buyer’s problem of just selecting her utility-
maximizing set from a given item-pricing is also NP-hard! Therefore, buyers may be-
have quite unpredictably in the face of an item-pricing depending on how well they can
optimize. Moreover, even if we are willing to assume that the buyer has the computa-
tional power to select her utility-maximizing set, it is known still that (without our in-
dependence assumption) finding an nc-approximately optimal mechanism is NP-hard
for all c = O(1) [Cai et al. 2013]. We sidestep all these difficulties by not attempting to
compute or approximate SREV at all, nor trying to predict bizarre buyer behavior. We
instead perform our analysis on revenue contributions only of items purchased when
the buyer is not willing to purchase any others. Buyer behavior in such instances is pre-
dictable and easily computable: simply purchase the unique item for which v({i}) > pi.
It is surprising that such an analysis suffices, as it completely ignores any revenue con-
tribution coming from the entirely plausible event that the buyer is willing to purchase
multiple items.
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1.2. Techniques
We prove our main theorem by making use of the core-tail decomposition framework
introduced by Li and Yao [Li and Yao 2013]. There are three high-level steps to apply-
ing the framework. The first is proving a “core decomposition” lemma that separates
the optimal revenue into contributions from items which the buyer values very highly
(the “tail”), and items which the buyer values not so high (the “core”). The second
is showing that the contribution from the tail can be approximated well by SREV.
The third is showing that the contribution from the core can be approximated well by
max{SREV,BREV}.
The Core Decomposition Lemma. The proof of the original Core Decomposition
Lemma in [Li and Yao 2013] was obtained by cleverly stringing together simple claims
proved in [Hart and Nisan 2012]. As discussed above, these seemingly “obvious” claims
may not extend beyond additive valuations over independent items, due to the fact
that the buyer’s value cannot be separated across items. Nevertheless, we are able to
prove an approximate version of the core decomposition lemma for subadditive buyers
(Lemma 3.6) by making use of ideas from reductions from ǫ-truthful mechanisms to
fully truthful ones. Like in [Babaioff et al. 2014], our core decomposition lemma holds
for many buyers. The proof for a single buyer, which is the focus of this paper can be
found in Section 3.1. We also provide (Section 5) a more technically involved proof for
many buyers which builds on heavier tools from [Bei and Huang 2011; Hartline et al.
2011; Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012].
Bounding the Tail’s Contribution. Arguments for bounding the contribution from the
tail in prior work (and ours) use the following reasoning. If the cutoff between core and
tail is sufficiently high, then the probability that k items are simultaneously in the
tail for a sampled valuation decays exponentially in k. If one can also show that the
approximation guarantee of SREV decays subexponentially in k, then we can bound
the gap between SREV and the tail’s contribution by a constant factor. We show that
indeed the approximation guarantee of SREV decays only polynomially in k.
Bounding the Core’s Contribution. Arguments for bounding the contribution from
the core in prior work (and ours) use the following reasoning. The total expected
value for items in the core is a subadditive function of independent random variables
(bounded above by the core-tail cutoff). If the cutoff between core and tail is suffi-
ciently low, then one of two things must happen. Either the expected contribution from
the core is also small, in which case SREV itself provides a good approximation, or
the expected contribution is large, and therefore also large with respect to the cutoffs.
In the latter case, a concentration bound implies that BREV must provide a good ap-
proximation. In the additive case, the appropriate concentration bound is Chebyshev’s
inequality. In the subadditive case, we need heavier tools, and apply a concentration
bound due to Schechtman [Schechtman 1999].
1.3. Connection to Approximate Revenue-Monotonicity
Consider designing revenue-optimal mechanisms for two different markets, and sup-
pose that the valuations of the consumers in the first market first-order stochastically
dominate2 the valuations of the consumers in the second market. It then seems rea-
sonable to expect that the optimal revenue achieved from the first market, REV(D+),
should be at least as large as the revenue achieved from the dominated market,
2We say that a distributionD+ over valuation functions v+ first-order stochastically dominates distribution
D over valuation functions v if the probability spaces can be coupled so that for every subset S, v+ (S) ≥
v (S).
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REV(D). When there is just a single item for sale, this is an easy corollary of the
format for Myerson’s optimal auction. Yet Hart and Reny provided an example where
this intuition breaks even in a setting as simple as an additive buyer with i.i.d. values
for two items [Hart and Reny 2012]. Surprisingly, their example shows that it is pos-
sible to make strictly more revenue in a market when buyers have strictly less value
for your goods, and the market need not even be very complex for this phenomenon to
occur.
A natural question to ask then, is how large this anomaly can be. For example, Hart
and Reny’s constructions exhibit a (multiplicative) gap of 33/32 between REV(D+) and
REV(D) for an additive buyer with correlated values for two items, and (1+ 17000000 ) for
an additive buyer with i.i.d. values for two items. Interestingly, the simple mechanisms
of [Hart and Nisan 2012; Li and Yao 2013; Babaioff et al. 2014] upper bound the possi-
ble gap of any instance where their results apply, since SREV and BREV are monotone
for additive buyers (i.e. SREV(D+) ≥ SREV(D) and BREV(D+) ≥ BREV(D)). Specif-
ically, for an additive buyer the gap is at most (1 + 1/e) for two i.i.d. items, 2 for two
asymmetric independent items, and 6 for any number of independent items. In Section
4 we show that as a corollary of our results, the gap is also constant for a subadditive
buyer with independent items. Interestingly, this connection between approximately
optimal simple mechanisms and approximate revenue-monotonicity is also fruitful in
the other direction: it turns out that improving the bound on approximatemonotonicity
for a subadditive buyer would also improve the constant in our main theorem. Finally,
we show in Section 4.3 that for an additive buyer with correlated values for two items,
the gap is potentially infinite. (This is the case for which Hart and Reny provide a gap
of 33/32.) The proof is by a black-box reduction from an example due to Hart and Nisan
[Hart and Nisan 2013] that exhibits a similar gap between simple and optimal mech-
anisms, further demonstrating the connection between these two important research
directions.
1.4. Discussion, Related Work and Open Problems
Our work contributes to the recent growing literature on simple, approximately opti-
mal mechanisms. We extend greatly beyond prior work, providing the first simple and
approximately optimal mechanisms for buyers with combinatorial valuations. Prior to
our work, virtually nothing was known about this setting (modulo the impossibility
result of [Cai et al. 2013]). Our results also demonstrate the strength of the core-tail
decomposition framework developed by Li and Yao to go beyond additive buyers.
In our opinion, the most exciting open question in this area is extending these re-
sults to multiple buyers. A beautiful lookahead reduction was previously developed
by Yao [Yao 2015] for additive buyers, but applying his techniques for combinatorial
bidders proved quite challenging. Following a preliminary version of this paper, oth-
ers have built upon our techniques and made quite significant progress on this prob-
lem [Cai et al. 2016; Chawla and Miller 2016; Cai and Zhao 2017]. To put them in con-
text with respect to ours:
— [Cai et al. 2016] provide an alternative proof of Yao’s result and improve the constant
factor (from 69 to 8). They also provide a duality framework, and show that essen-
tialy all bounds on the optimal revenue used in prior works can be derived by essen-
tially the same dual solution. The only exception we are aware of is our “approximate
marginal mechanism” lemma, which to date has no “duality proof” in their frame-
work. It would be interesting to understand this lemma in terms of duality, but not
essential for its application.
— [Chawla and Miller 2016] provide the first approximately optimal mechanism for
multiple combinatorial buyers. Without getting into a full definition, their results
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apply to a special case of valuations that are “gross substitutes over independent
items.” They also improve the constant factor in our analysis. Their work did make
use of part of our analysis, but required substantial conceptual novelty.
—Most recently, [Cai and Zhao 2017] extended their result to multiple buyers that
are “XOS over independent items.” Their result draws on numerous previous works,
those referenced above [Yao 2015; Cai et al. 2016; Chawla and Miller 2016], ours, and
also the posted-pricemechanism of [Feldman et al. 2015] forwelfare-maximization in
Bayesian settings with multiple XOS bidders. They obtain a logarithmic approxima-
tion for multiple buyers that are subadditive over independent items, and the main
bottleneck in extending their constant-factor approximation from XOS to subadditive
is that Feldman et al.’s welfare guarantee only holds for XOS valuations. Obtaining a
constant-factor approximation for many buyers with subadditve valuations remains
a key open question, although each of the aforementioned papers makes substantial
progress beyond ours.
Another important direction is extending our understanding of simple mechanisms
to models of limited correlation over values for disjoint sets of items3. Recent inde-
pendent work of Bateni et. al. [Bateni et al. 2015] addresses this direction, providing
approximation guarantees on max{SREV,BREV} vs. REV for an additive buyer whose
values for items are drawn from a common-base-value distribution and various ex-
tensions. Their results also make use of a core-tail decomposition, but the tools they
develop beyond the decomposition are disjoint from ours. A natural question in this
direction is whether our results extend to settings where buyer values are both combi-
natorial and exhibit limited correlation between disjoint sets of items, as the end goal
is to have a model that encompasses as many real-world instances as possible.
Other related works include an approximately optimal mechanism for an addi-
tive buyer when the seller incurs production costs [Ma and Simchi-Levi 2015], and
an approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer with restricted complementarities
[Eden et al. 2017]. [Rubinstein 2016] considers a related algorithmic problem of find-
ing the optimal partition mechanism (where the seller posts a take-it-or-leave-it price
on disjoint bundles). It remains unknown whether the optimal partition mechanism
can provide provably better guarantees than max{SREV,BREV} with respect to REV
in any domain.
If we were to idenfity the contributions of the present work that seem to have been
most useful in follow-up works, it would be:
—The “approximate marginal mechanism lemma,” Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 5.1, have
been used (e.g. by Cai and Zhao) to reduce from subadditive/gross substitutes/etc.
over independent items to “additive subject to downwards-closed/matroid/etc. con-
straints with independent items” at the cost of a constant factor.
—Our application of Schechtman’s bound in the core, Corollary 3.11, has been used in
essentially every follow-up work discussing optimal mechanisms for combinatorial
buyers [Chawla and Miller 2016; Cai and Zhao 2017; Eden et al. 2017].
— In the face of buyers for whom selecting a utility-maximizing bundle might be NP-
hard, the idea to count revenue only when it is trivial to select a utility-maximizing
bundle (e.g. because it is a singleton set) has proven useful in follow-up works such
as [Eden et al. 2017].
—Moreover, just a meaningful definition of “subadditive over independent items”
seemed to be useful in all of the referenced works, and even for the design of combi-
natorial prophet inequalities (where again some notion of independent is necessary
3Note that as we mention in the previous section, for arbitrary correlated items the gap can be infinite
[Hart and Nisan 2013; Briest et al. 2010].
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to subvert horrible lower bounds even in the additive case) [Rubinstein and Singla
2017].
2. PRELIMINARIES
We focus the initial exposition on the single-buyer problem, and postpone all de-
tails regarding auctions for multiple buyers to Section 5. There is a single revenue-
maximizing seller with n items for sale to a single buyer. The buyer has combinatorial
valuations for the items (i.e. value v(S) for receiving set S), and is quasi-linear and
risk-neutral. That is, the buyer’s utility for a randomized outcome that awards him set
S with probability A (S) while paying (expected) price p is
∑
S A (S) v(S) − p. The val-
uation v(·) is unknown to the seller, who has a prior D over possible buyer valuations
that is subadditive over independent items, a term we describe below. By the taxation
principle, the seller may restrict attention to only lottery systems. In other words, the
seller provides a list of potential lotteries (distributions over sets) each with a price,
and the buyer chooses the utility-maximizing option.
2.1. Subadditive valuations over independent items
We now carefully define what we mean by subadditive valuations over independent
items. Intuitively, our model is such that the buyer has some private information xi
pertaining to item i,4 andD~x is a product distribution over Rn representing the seller’s
prior over the private information possessed by the buyer. The buyer’s valuation for set
S is parametrized by the private information she has about items in that set, and can
be written as V (〈xi〉i∈S , S). In economic terms, this models that the items not received
by the buyer impose no externalities. We capture this formally in the definition below:
Definition 2.1. We say that a distributionD over valuation functions v(·) : {0, 1}n →
R is subadditive over independent items if:
(1) All v(·) in the support of D exhibit no externalities.
Formally, let ΩS =×i∈S Ωi, where each Ωi is a compact subset of a normed space.
There exists a distribution D~x over Ω[n] and functions VS : ΩS → R such that D is
the distribution that first samples ~x← D~x and outputs the valuation function v(·)
with v(S) = VS(〈xi〉i∈S) for all S.
(2) All v(·) in the support of D are monotone. That is, v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) for all S, T .
(3) All v(·) in the support of D are subadditive. That is, v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ).
(4) The private information is independent across items. That is, theD~x guaranteed in
property 1 is a product distribution.
We describe now how to encode commonly studied valuation distributions in this
model.
Example 2.2. The following types of distributions can be modeled as subadditive
over independent items. (Recall that ~x is the vector of independently sampled at-
tributes in the definition above.)
(1) Additive: Let Ωi = [0, 1] and interpret xi as the buyer’s value for item i.
VS(〈xi〉i∈S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
(2) k-demand: Let Ωi = [0, 1] and interpret xi as the buyer’s value for item i.
VS(〈xi〉i∈S) = maxT⊆S,|T |≤k{
∑
i∈T xi}.
(3) Additive up to I: Let Ωi = [0, 1] and interpret xi as the buyer’s value for item i.
VS(〈xi〉i∈S) = maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
i∈T xi}.
4Think of this information as “information about the buyer’s preferences related to item.”
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(4) Fractionally subadditive: Let Ωi = [0, 1]
k for any finite k and interpret xi as encod-
ing the values {vij}j∈[k]. VS(〈xi〉i∈S) = maxj{
∑
i∈S vij}.
2.2. Notation
Definition 2.3. For any distribution D of buyer’s valuation, we use the following
notation, most of which is due to [Hart and Nisan 2012; Babaioff et al. 2014]:
—Di: The distribution of v({i}) when v(·)← D.
— t: the cutoff between core and tail. If v({i}) > t, we say that item i is in the tail.
Otherwise it is in the core.
—DA: the distribution D, conditioned on A being exactly the set of items in the tail.
—DTA: the distribution DA restricted just to items in the tail (i.e. A).
—DCA : the distribution DA restricted just to items in the core (i.e. A¯).
— pi: the probability that element i is in the tail.
— pA: the probability that A is exactly the set of items in the tail (note that p{i} 6= pi).
— REV (D): The maximum revenue obtainable via a truthful mechanism from a buyer
with valuation profile drawn from D.
— BREV (D): The revenue obtainable from a buyer with valuation profile drawn from
D by auctioning the grand bundle via Myerson’s optimal auction.
— SREV (D): The maximum revenue obtainable from a buyer with valuation profile
drawn from D by pricing each item separately. Note that when the buyer is not
additive, SREV(D) behaves erratically and is NP-hard to find [Chen et al. 2014].
— REVq(D): For a one-dimensional distribution D, the optimal revenue obtained by a
reserve price that sells with probability at most q.
— SREV∗~q(D) :
∏
i(1 − qi) ·
∑
i REVqi(Di): a proxy for SREV(D) that behaves nicer and
is easy to compute.
— VAL (D): the buyer’s expected valuation for the grand bundle, Ev←D [v ([n])].
When the distribution is clear from the context, we simply use REV, VAL, etc. Most
of this notation is standard following [Hart and Nisan 2012], with the exception of
REVq and SREV
∗
~q . We introduce SREV
∗
~q because it will serve as a proxy to SREV that
behaves nicely and is easy to compute. Note that SREV∗~q is essentially computing the
revenue of the best item pricing that sells item i with probability at most qi, but only
counting revenue from cases where the other values are too low to have possibly sold
(and actually it undercounts this quantity).
Remark 2.4. In our definitions of REVq(D) and SREV
∗
~q(D) we assume without loss
of generality that for every single-dimensional D and q ∈ [0, 1] it is possible to set a
price that sells with probability exactly q. When D is a continuous distribution, this is
true by the intermediate value theorem. When D has a point mass, this is no longer
true per se. Fortunately, there are standard methods for reducing the study of arbitrary
distributions to continuous ones with arbitrarily small loss. We briefly sketch one, a
rounding scheme commonly attributed to Nisan (that appears also in [Chawla et al.
2007; Cai and Huang 2013]):
For any ǫ > 0, D can be “smoothed” into a continuous distribution Dǫ by multiplying
samples from D by a random factor drawn uniformly from [1, 1 + ǫ]. For any smoothed
Dǫ, the desired prices exist by the intermediate value theorem. Using techniques sim-
ilar in spirit to those of Section 3.1, it is easy (both computationally and conceptually)
to convert mechanisms for Dǫ to mechanisms for D, and vice versa, with negligible
(dependent on ǫ) loss in revenue. Therefore, one may formally study Dǫ for sufficiently
small ǫ, and all results hold with respect to D as well with negligible loss (and taking
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ǫ→ 0 results in no loss at all). So for the remainder of the paper, we will assume w.l.o.g.
that all distributions are continuous, and therefore the desired prices exist.
We conclude the preliminaries by stating a lemma of Hart and Nisan that we will
use. We include the proof below for completeness, as well as to verify that it continues
to hold when the valuations are not additive.
LEMMA 2.5 (SUB-DOMAIN STITCHING SPECIAL CASE [HART AND NISAN 2012]).
REV(D) ≤∑A pAREV(DA).
PROOF. Let M be an optimal mechanism for selling items with valuations sam-
pled from D, and let REVM (D) = REV (D) denote its revenue. Then, REVM (D) =∑
pAREVM (DA). Also, for each A ⊆ [n], REVM (DA) ≤ REV (DA).
3. MAIN RESULT: CONSTANT-FACTOR APPROXIMATION FOR SUBADDITIVE BUYER
THEOREM 3.1. When D is subadditive over independent items, there exists a proba-
bility vector ~q such that:
REV(D) ≤ 314SREV∗~q(D) + 24BREV(D)
Furthermore, ~q can be computed efficiently, as well as an induced item pricing that
yields expected revenue at least SREV∗~q(D).
Proof outline. We follow the core-tail decomposition framework. First, we provide an
approximate core decomposition lemma in Section 3.1. Then, we provide a bound on
the contribution of the core with respect to max
{
BREV, SREV∗
}
in Section 3.2, and a
bound on the contribution of the tail with respect to SREV∗ as a function of the cutoffs
chosen in Section 3.3.
For ease of exposition, we simply set t so that the probability of having an empty tail
is exactly half; i.e. p∅ =
∏
(1− pi) = 1/2. We also set ~q = ~p.
3.1. Approximate Core Decomposition
In this section, we prove our approximate core decomposition lemma. The key in-
gredient will be an approximate version of the “Marginal Mechanism” lemma from
[Cai and Huang 2013; Hart and Nisan 2012] for subadditive buyers, stated below:
LEMMA 3.2. (“Approximate Marginal Mechanism”)
Let S,X be a partition of [n], and let D =
(
DS , DX
)
be the joint distribution for the
valuations of items in S,X , respectively, for buyers with subadditive valuations. Then
for any 0 < ǫ < 1,
REV (D) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DS
)
+
1
1− ǫEvS←DS
[
REV
(
DX | vS)] (1)
When DS and DX are independent, this simplifies to
REV(D) ≤ (1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ )VAL(D
S) +
1
1− ǫREV(D
X).
We outline the proof of Lemma 3.2 below. We first recall the original “Marginal Mech-
anism” lemma (that holds for an additive buyer without any multipliers). We provide
a complete proof so that the reader can see where the argument fails for subadditive
buyers.
LEMMA 3.3. (“Marginal Mechanism” [Cai and Huang 2013; Hart and Nisan 2012])
Let S⊔X be any partition of [n], and letD+ be any distribution over valuation functions
such that v+(U) = v+(U ∩ S) + v+(U ∩ X) for all U ⊆ n, and v+ in the support of D+.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:10 Rubinstein and Weinberg
Let also DS denote D+ restricted to items in S and DX denote D+ restricted to items in
X . Then REV(D+) ≤ VAL(DS) + EvS←DS [REV(DX |vS)].
PROOF. We design a mechanism MX (the “Marginal Mechanism”) to sell items in
X to consumers sampled from DX |vS based on the optimal mechanism M for selling
items in S⊔X to consumers sampled fromD+. Define A(v) to be the (possibly random)
allocation of items awarded to type v in M , and p(v) to be the price paid. Let MX first
sample a value vS ← DS . The buyer is then invited to report any type vX , andMX will
award him the items inA(vS , vX)∩X and charge him price p(vS , vX)−vS(A(vS , vX)∩S).
In other words, the buyer will receive value from exactly the same items in MX as he
would have received inM , except he receives the actual items in X , whereas for items
in S he is given a monetary rebate instead of his actual value.
We first claim that if M is truthful, then so is MX . The utility of a buyer with type
vX for reporting wX toMX can be written as: vX(A(vS , wX)∩X)+ vS(A(vS , wX)∩S)−
p(vS , wX) = (vS , vX)(A(vS , wX))−p(vS , wX), which is exactly the utility of a buyer with
type (vS , vX) for reporting (vS , wX) to M . As M was truthful, we know that a buyer
with type (vS , vX)maximizes utility when reporting (vS , vX) over all possible (vS , wX).
Therefore, a buyer with type vX prefers to tell the truth as well.
Finally, we just have to compute the revenue ofMX . For each vS , the marginal mech-
anism provides a concrete mechanism for the distribution DX |vS that attains revenue
at least REV(D+|vS)−vS(S). So REV(DX |vS) ≥ REV(D+|vS)−vS(S). Taking an expec-
tation over all vS (and an application of sub-domain stitching) yields the lemma.
Notice that it is crucial in the proof above that the buyer’s value could be written as
vS(·) + vX(·). Otherwise the auctioneer does not know how much to “reimburse” the
buyer, since the correct amount depends on the buyer’s private information. The buyer
can then manipulate his own report vX to influence how much he gets reimbursed for
the items in S.
A natural approach then, given any distribution D over subadditive valuations, is to
define a new value distribution D+ by redefining all v(·) to satisfy v(U) = v(U ∩ S) +
v(U ∩X) (it is easy to see that all valuations in the support ofD+ are still subadditive).
Unfortunately, even though D+ (first-order stochastically) dominates D, due to non-
monotonicity we could very well have REV(D+) < REV(D). Still, we bound the revenue
lost as we move fromD toD+ by making use of tools for turning ǫ-truthful mechanisms
into truly truthful ones. Lemma 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 below capture this formally.
LEMMA 3.4. Consider two coupled distributions D and D+, with v(·) and v+(·) de-
noting a random sample from each. Define the random function δ(·) so that δ(S) =
v+(S) − v(S) for all S. Suppose that δ(S) ≥ 0 for all S and that δ(·) also satisfies
ED
[
maxS⊆[n]{δ (S)}
] ≤ δ. Then for any 0 < ǫ < 1,
REV(D+) ≥ (1− ǫ) (REV(D)− δ¯/ǫ) .
PROOF. Consider a mechanismM which achieves the optimal revenue REV(D). Let
(φv, pv) denote the lottery purchased by a buyer with type v in M , where φv is a (pos-
sibly randomized) allocation, and p is a price. Consider now the mechanism M+ that
offers the same menu as M , but with all prices discounted by a factor of (1− ǫ). Let
(φ+v , p
+
v ) denote the lottery that a buyer with type v
+ (coupled with v) chooses to pur-
chase inM+ (knowing that she would only pay (1− ǫ)p+v because of the discount). The
following inequalities must hold (we will abuse notation and let v(ψ) = ES←ψ[v(S)]):
v(φv)− pv ≥ v(φ+v )− p+v . (2)
v+(φ+v )− (1− ǫ) p+v ≥ v+(φv)− (1− ǫ) pv (3)
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Now, summing equations (2) and (3) (then making use of the definition of δ(·) and the
fact that it is non-negative), we have:
ǫp+v + δ(φ
+
v ) ≥ ǫpv
⇒ p+v ≥ pv − δ(φ+v )/ǫ
We can now bound the expected revenue by taking an expectation over all valuations:
REV
(
D+
) ≥ Ev←D [(1− ǫ)p+v ]
≥ (1− ǫ)Ev←D
[
pv − δ(φ+v )/ǫ
]
≥ (1− ǫ)REV(D)− (1− ǫ)δ¯/ǫ
COROLLARY 3.5. For a given partition of [n], S ⊔ X , and distribution D over sub-
additive valuations, define DS to be D restricted to items in S, and D
+ to first sample
v ← D, and output v+(·) with v+(U) = v(U ∩ S) + v(U ∩ X). Then for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1),
REV(D) ≤ REV(D+)1−ǫ + VAL(DS)ǫ .
PROOF. By monotonicity, v(U) ≥ v(U ∩ X) for all U,X . Therefore, v+(U) − v(U) ≤
v(U ∩ S) ≤ v(S) for all U . Furthermore, by subadditivity, we have v+(U) ≥ v(U) for
all U . Together, this means that D and D+ are coupled so that we can set δ(U) ≤ v(S)
for all U . Therefore, we may set δ¯ = VAL(DS) in the hypothesis of Lemma 3.4. The
corollary follows by rearranging the inequality.
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is now a combination of Corollary 3.5 and Lemma 3.3.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.2. Chaining Corollary 3.5 together with Lemma 3.3 we get:
REV(D) ≤ REV(D
+)
1− ǫ +
VAL(DS)
ǫ
≤ VAL(D
S) + EvS←DS
[
REV(DX |vS)]
1− ǫ +
VAL(DS)
ǫ
=
(
1
1− ǫ +
1
ǫ
)
VAL(DS) +
1
1− ǫEvS←DS
[
REV(DX |vS)] ,
as desired.
We can now provide our approximate core decomposition by combining sub domain
stitching (Lemma 2.5) and approximate marginal mechanism (Lemma 3.2).
LEMMA 3.6. (“Approximate Core Decomposition”) For any distribution D that is
subadditive over independent items, and any 0 < ǫ < 1,
REV (D) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DC∅
)
+
1
1− ǫ
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
)
.
In particular, for ǫ = 1/2, we have
REV (D) ≤ 4VAL (DC∅ )+ 2
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
)
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PROOF. By the Approximate Marginal Mechanism Lemma (Lemma 3.2),
REV (DA) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DCA
)
+
1
1− ǫREV
(
DTA
)
Also, for any A ⊆ [n],
VAL
(
DCA
) ≤ VAL (DC∅ )
Finally, by sub-domain stitching (Lemma 2.5):
REV (D) ≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV (DA)
≤
∑
A⊆[n]
pA
((
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DCA
)
+
1
1− ǫREV
(
DTA
))
≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DC∅
)
+
1
1− ǫ
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
)
3.2. Core
Here, we show how to bound VAL(DC∅ ) usingmax{SREV∗~q(D),BREV(D)}. We use a con-
centration result due to Schechtman [Schechtman 1999] that first requires a definition.
Intuitively, the definition below says that a distribution is c-Lipschitz if changing the
“private information” for a single item cannot change the buyer’s value for any set by
more than c. Moreover, adding/removing a single item cannot change the buyer’s value
for any set by more than c.
Definition 3.7. LetD~x denote a distribution of private information, V denote a valu-
ation function V (~x, ·), and D denote the distribution that samples ~x← D~x and outputs
the function v(·) = V (~x, ·). Then D is c−Lipschitz if for all ~x, ~y, and sets S and T we
have:
|V (~x, S)− V (~y, T )| ≤ c · (|S ∪ T | − |S ∩ T |+ |{i ∈ S ∩ T : xi 6= yi}|) .
Before applying Schechtman’s theorem, we show that DC∅ is t-Lipschitz (recall that t is
the cutoff between core and tail).
LEMMA 3.8. Let D be any distribution that is subadditive over independent items
where each v({i}) ∈ [0, c] with probability 1. Then D is c-Lipschitz.
PROOF. For any ~x, ~y, S, T , let U = {i ∈ S ∩ T |xi = yi}. Because of no externalities,
we must have V (~x, U) = V (~y, U), which we will denote by B. By monotonicity, we must
have V (~x, S), V (~y, T ) ≥ B.
Now, by subadditivity and the fact that each V (~x, {i}) ≤ c, we have V (~x, S) ≤ c(|S| −
|U |) +B. Similarly, we have V (~y, T ) ≤ c(|T | − |U |) + B.
It’s also clear that |S|− |U | ≤ |S ∪T |− |S ∩T |+ |{i ∈ S ∩T : xi 6= yi}| (the RHS is just
rewriting the size of S∪T−U ), and that |T |−|U | ≤ |S∪T |−|S∩T |+|{i ∈ S∩T : xi 6= yi}|.
So by everything above, we must have V (~x, S), V (~y, T ) ≤ B+ c(|S∪T |− |S∩T |+ |{i ∈
S ∩ T : xi 6= yi}|). Therefore V (~x, S), V (~y, S) ∈ [B,B + c(|S ∪ T | − |S ∩ T |+ |{i ∈ S ∩ T :
xi 6= yi}|)], completing the proof.
COROLLARY 3.9. DC∅ is t-Lipschitz.
Now we state Schechtman’s theorem and apply it to bound VAL(DC∅ ).
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THEOREM 3.10. ([Schechtman 1999]) Suppose that D is a distribution that is sub-
additive over independent items and c-Lipschitz. Then for any parameters q, a, k > 0,
Pr
v←D
[v ([n]) ≥ (q + 1) a+ k · c] ≤ Pr [v ([n]) ≤ a]−q q−k
In particular, if a is the median of v ([n]) |v←D and q = 2, we have
Pr
v←D
[v ([n]) ≥ 3a+ k · c] ≤ 4 · 2−k
COROLLARY 3.11. Suppose that D is a distribution that is subadditive over inde-
pendent items and c-Lipschitz. If a is the median of v ([n]) |v←D, then Ev←D [v ([n])] ≤
3a+ 4c/ ln 2.
PROOF. E [v ([n])] =
∫∞
0
Pr [v ([n]) > y] dy. We can upper bound this using the mini-
mum of 1 and the bound provided in Theorem 3.10 to yield:
E [v ([n])] ≤ 3a+
∫ ∞
0
4 · 2−y/cdy = 3a+ 4c/ ln 2
PROPOSITION 3.12. VAL(DC∅ ) ≤ 6BREV + 4t/ ln 2.
PROOF. Since a is the median of v ([n]), we can set price a on the grand bundle and
extract revenue at least a/2. Therefore, BREV ≥ a/2. By Corollary 3.11 and 3.9, we
have VAL(DC∅ ) ≤ 3a+ 4t/ ln(2), so VAL(DC∅ ) ≤ 6BREV + 4t/ ln(2).
Finally, if the cutoff t is not too large, we can recover a constant fraction of it by selling
each item separately.
LEMMA 3.13. SREV∗~p ≥ t · p∅ (1− p∅). In particular, if we choose t so that p∅ = 1/2,
then SREV∗~p ≥ t/4.
PROOF. Clearly REVpi(Di) ≥ pit, as we could set a price of t for item i. So SREV∗~p =
p∅
∑
i REVpi(Di) ≥ p∅t
∑
i pi Finally, we observe that
∑
i pi is exactly the expected num-
ber of items in the tail, and p∅ is the probability that zero items are in the tail. So we
clearly have
∑
i pi ≥ 1− p∅.
Combining Proposition 3.12 and Lemma 3.13 then yields:
PROPOSITION 3.14.
VAL(DC∅ ) ≤ 6BREV + 24SREV∗~p.
PROOF. By Proposition 3.12, VAL(DC∅ ) ≤ 6BREV + 4t/ ln(2). By Lemma 3.13, t ≤
4SREV∗~p. As 16/ ln(2) ≤ 24, we get the proposition as desired.
3.3. Tail
We now show that the revenue from the tail can be approximated by SREV∗~q . We be-
gin by proving a much weaker bound on the optimum revenue for any distribution of
subadditive valuations over independent items:
LEMMA 3.15.
REV (D) ≤ 6nlog2 6
∑
i
REV (Di) .
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PROOF. Babaioff et al. [Babaioff et al. 2014] prove that REV ≤ n∑i REV (Di) for an
additive buyer by recursively reducing the number of items by one at each step. Un-
fortunately, each step of the induction uses the Marginal Mechanism Lemma; when
applying the approximate variant for subadditive valuations, we would incur an expo-
nential factor.
Instead, we use a slightly more complicated argument along the lines of Hart and
Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2012] that halves the number of items in each step. Let S and
X be a partition of [n] into subsets of size at most ⌈n/2⌉. Let DS≥X be the distribution
over valuations which is the same as D whenever v (S) ≥ v (T ), and has valuation zero
otherwise. Similarly, let DS<X be the distribution which is equal to D on v (S) < (T ).
Then by sub-domain stitching (Lemma 2.5) we have,
REV (D) ≤ REV (DS≥X) + REV (DS<X) . (4)
Now, by the Approximate Marginal Mechanism Lemma,
REV (DS≥X) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL
(
DXS≥X
)
+
1
1− ǫEvX←DXS≥X
[
REV
(
DSS≥X | vX
)]
(5)
One mechanism for selling items in S is to sample vX ← DXS≥X , and then use a mech-
anism that achieves REV
(
DSS≥X | vX
)
. Thus we have,
REV
(
DS
) ≥ EvX←DX
S≥X
[
REV
(
DSS≥X | vX
)]
. (6)
Another way to sell items in S is to again sample vX ← DXS≥X , and offer the entire
bundle for price vX (X). Therefore we also have,
REV
(
DS
) ≥ Ev←D
[
v (X) |
(
v (S) ≥ v (X)
)]
= Ev←DS≥X [v (X)] = VAL
(
DXS≥X
)
. (7)
Combining equations (5)-(7), we have
REV (DS≥X) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
2
1− ǫ
)
REV
(
DS
)
By symmetry, the same holds for REV (DS<X) and REV
(
DX
)
. Therefore using (4),
REV (D) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
2
1− ǫ
)(
REV
(
DS
)
+ REV
(
DX
))
Applying the recursion ⌈logn⌉ times, we have
REV (D) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
2
1− ǫ
)log2 n+1∑
i
REV (Di) =
(
1
ǫ
+
2
1− ǫ
)
nlog2(
1
ǫ
+ 2
1−ǫ )
∑
i
REV (Di)
Choosing ǫ = 1/2 yields
(
1
ǫ +
2
1−ǫ
)
= 6.
Note that in Lemma 3.15,
∑
i REV(Di) is not the same as SREV(D) as the buyer
is not necessarily additive. In fact, they can be off by a factor of n (in the case of a
unit-demand buyer). Nonetheless, this weak bound suffices for our analysis of the tail,
which is summarized in Proposition 3.16 below. Essentially, the proposition amplifies
the bound in Lemma 3.15 greatly by making use of the fact that it is unlikely to see
multiple items in the tail.
PROPOSITION 3.16. Recall that pi = Pr[v({i}) > t], and p∅ =
∏
i(1− pi). Then∑
A
pAREV(D
T
A) ≤
6
p∅
(
1 + 7 ln(1/p∅) + 6 ln(1/p∅)
2 + ln(1/p∅)
3
) · SREV∗~p
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In particular, if we choose t so that p∅ = 1/2, then
∑
A pAREV(D
T
A) ≤ 109 · SREV∗~p
PROOF. Our proof builds on the intuition that the number of items in the tail is
typically very small. By Lemma 3.15, we have that
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
) ≤ ∑
A⊆[n]
pA6 |A|log2 6
∑
i∈A
REV
(
DTi
)
= 6
∑
i∈[n]
piREV
(
DTi
)∑
A∋i
|A|log2 6 pA/pi (8)
For any i, the expression
∑
A∋i |A| pA/pi is also the expected number of items in the
tail, conditioning on i being in the tail. Similarly,
∑
A∋i |A|log2 6 pA/pi is the expected
value of (# items)log2 6. Let bj be the indicator random variable that is 1 whenever item
j is in the tail. Noting that log2 6 < 3 and each bj is 1 with probability exactly pj and
the bj ’s are independent, we have:
∑
A∋i
|A|log2 6 pA/pi ≤ Ebj



1 +∑
j 6=i
bj


3


= Ebj

1 + 3

∑
j 6=i
bj

+ 3

∑
j 6=i
bj


2
+

∑
j 6=i
bj


3


= 1 + 3E

∑
j 6=i
bj

+ 3E

∑
j 6=i
b2j +
∑
k 6=j 6=i
bjbk


+E

∑
j 6=i
b3j + 3
∑
k 6=j 6=i
b2jbk +
∑
l 6=k 6=j 6=i
bjbkbl


= 1 + 7E

∑
j 6=i
bj

+ 6E

 ∑
k 6=j 6=i
bjbk

+ E

 ∑
l 6=k 6=j 6=i
bjbkbl

 (9)
≤ 1 + 7
∑
j 6=i
pj + 6

∑
j 6=i
pj


2
+

∑
j 6=i
pj


3
(10)
(9) follows because bj ∈ {0, 1}. We continue to bound the last line as a function of
just p∅. Note that e
−
∑
i pi ≥ ∏i(1 − pi) = p∅, and therefore we have ∑i pi ≤ ln(1/p∅).
Combining with (8) and (10), we have:
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
) ≤ 6 (1 + 7 ln(1/p∅) + 6 ln(1/p∅)2 + ln(1/p∅)3) · ∑
i∈[n]
piREV
(
DTi
)
Now, we have to interpret piREV(D
T
i ). We claim that in fact this is exactly REVpi(Di).
Why? It’s clear that the optimal reserve for DTi is at least t, as D
T
i is not supported
below t. It’s also easy to see that for any reserve ri ≥ t, that the revenue obtained by
selling to DTi is exactly ri · Pr[v({i}) > ri]/pi, and therefore the same ri ≥ t that is
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optimal for Di is also optimal for D
T
i , and piREV(D
T
i ) = REVpi(Di). Therefore,
∑
A⊆[n]
pAREV
(
DTA
) ≤ 6 (1 + 7 ln(1/p∅) + 6 ln(1/p∅)2 + ln(1/p∅)3) · ∑
i∈[n]
REVpi (Di)
Plug in SREV∗~p = p∅
∑
i∈[n] REVpi (Di) to complete the proof.
Note that Theorem 3.1 is now a corollary of Proposition 3.16, Proposition 3.14, and
Lemma 3.6 (setting ǫ = 1/2). That the desired ~q can be computed efficiently is easy to
see: simply do a binary search over cutoffs t until we find one that induces p∅ = 1/2. It
is also easy to find an item pricing that guarantees revenue at least SREV∗~q : for each
item i, simply find the optimal reserve for Di, subject to that reserve being at least t.
Finally, notice that the only bundle price we ever need to set to obtain our guarantee
is the median of v([n]), when v(·) ← DC∅ . It is also easy to see that our bounds degrade
smoothly if we set a price that only approximates the median instead. For a discussion
of exactly what access to D suffices in order for these prices/cutoffs to be truly easy to
find, we refer the reader to [Babaioff et al. 2014]. We note here just that it should be
clear that any reasonable, even minimal, access to D does indeed suffice.
4. SIMPLE AUCTIONS AND APPROXIMATE REVENUE MONOTONICITY
In this section we explore the rich connection between approximately optimal simple
auctions, and approximate revenue monotonicity. By approximate revenue monotonic-
ity, we formally mean the following:
Definition 4.1. We say that a class of distributions is α-approximately revenue
monotone if for any two distributions D and D+ in that class such that D+ first-order
stochastically dominates D (recall that we D+ first-order stochastically dominates D
if they can be coupled so that when we sample v+ from D+ and v from D we have
v+(S) ≥ v(S) for all S), α · REV (D+) ≥ REV (D).
In the rest of the section we observe that subadditive valuations over independent
items are α-approximately monotone for some constant factor (Subsection 4.1). We also
note that a (significantly) tighter approximate monotonicity would yield a better factor
of approximation in Theorem 3.1 (Subsection 4.2). Finally, for the class of (possibly
correlated) additive valuations over n items, we prove a reduction from approximate
revenue monotonicity to approximately optimal simple auctions (that loses a factor of
n). Then we use an infinite gap betweenmax {BREV, SREV} and REV for two correlated
items due to Hart and Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2013] to prove an infinite lower bound
on approximate revenue monotonicity (Subsection 4.3).
4.1. Approximately optimal simple auctions imply approximate monotonicity
As a corollary of our main theorem (Theorem 3.1) we deduce constant-factor approxi-
mate monotonicity for subadditive valuations over independent items:
COROLLARY 4.2. The class of subadditive valuations over independent items is 338-
approximately monotone.
Similarly, from the 6-approximation of Babaioff et al. for additive yields.
COROLLARY 4.3. The class of additive valuations over independent items is 6-
approximately monotone.
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PROOF. For additive functions, BREV and SREV constitute of separate Myerson’s
auctions, and are therefore revenue monotone. Thus,
6REV
(
D+
) ≥ 6max{BREV (D+) , SREV (D+)}
≥ 6max{BREV (D) , SREV (D)} ≥ REV (D)
For subadditive functions, SREV(D) is no longer monotone, but SREV∗~q(D) is. This
is because SREVq(Di) is clearly monotone, and SREV
∗
~q is just a (scaled) sum of
SREVqi(Di). So we get that there exists a ~q such that:
338REV
(
D+
) ≥ 338max{BREV (D+) , SREV∗~q (D+)}
≥ 338max{BREV (D) , SREV∗~q (D)} ≥ REV (D)
4.2. Approximate monotonicity implies approximately optimal simple auctions
A closer look at the proof of our main theorem also yields the converse of the above
corollaries, namely: a tighter approximate monotonicity for subadditive valuations
would yield an improved factor of approximation by simple auctions, as well as a sim-
pler proof.
COROLLARY 4.4. If the class of subadditive valuations over independent items is
α-approximately monotone, then
REV ≤ α
(
(37α+ 24)SREV + 6BREV
)
PROOF. (Sketch)
Recall that in the proof of the Approximate Marginal Mechanism Lemma (Lemma
3.2), we made use of Lemma 3.4 to bound the gap between REV(D+) and REV(D),
where D+ first-order stochastically dominated D. Instead of the ǫ-truthful to truth-
ful reduction, we could derive αREV(D+) ≥ REV (D) from approximate monotonicity.
Then, we can directly apply Lemma 3.3 to get:
REV (D) ≤ α (VAL (DS)+ EvS∼DS [REV (DX | vS)])
Instead of
REV (D) ≤ 4VAL (DS)+ 2EvS∼DS [REV (DX | vS)]
If α ≤ 2, this indeed yields a tighter approximation.
4.3. Correlated Distributions are not Approximately Monotone
So far we’ve shown that (for some valuation classes) approximately optimal simple
mechanisms imply approximate revenue-monotonicity. Are all classes approximately
revenue-monotone? In this subsection we provide a reduction from an instance where
max {SREV,BREV} does not approximate REV to show an infinite non-monotonicity
for correlated items. We first prove a reduction from gaps between BREV and REV to
non-monotonicity.
PROPOSITION 4.5. Let D be a distribution over subadditive valuations for n items
for which REV(D) > c · BREV(D). Then any class of distributions containingD and all
single-dimensional distributions5 is not (c/n)-approximately revenue monotone.
5A distribution is single-dimensional if for all v in its support, v(S) = c|S| for some value c.
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PROOF. We define D+ as follows. First, sample v ← D. Then let i∗ =
argmaxi{v({i})}. Now, set v+(S) = v({i∗}) · |S| for all |S|. By subadditivity, it’s
clear that D+ first order stochastically dominates D. Now, however, D+ is a single-
dimensional distribution, meaning that BREV(D+) = REV(D+) [Myerson 1981;
Riley and Zeckhauser 1983]. Finally, we just need to compare BREV(D) to BREV(D+).
Note that by monotonicity, we have v+([n]) ≤ n · v([n]) for all v, v+. Therefore, for
any price p, if v+([n]) > p, v([n]) > p/n. This immediately implies that BREV(D) ≥
BREV(D+)/n: let p be the optimal reserve for the grand bundle under D+, then set-
ting price p/n sells with at least the same probability under D. Putting both observa-
tions together, we see that: REV(D) > cBREV(D) ≥ (c/n)BREV(D+) = (c/n)REV(D+),
meaning that any class containingD and D+ is not (c/n)-approximately monotone.
We apply Proposition 4.5 to a theorem of Hart and Nisan.
THEOREM 4.6. (Hart and Nisan [Hart and Nisan 2013]) There exists a distribution
D over correlated additive valuations for two items such that BREV (D) ≤ 1/2, and
REV (D) =∞.
COROLLARY 4.7. There exist distributions D and D+ over over correlated addi-
tive valuations for two items such that D+ first-order stochastically dominates D,
REV (D+) = 1, and yet REV (D) = ∞. Therefore, the class of correlated additive val-
uations for two items is not c-approximately revenue monotone for any finite c.
5. APPROXIMATE MARGINAL MECHANISM AND CORE DECOMPOSITION FOR MANY
BIDDERS
In this section we provide a complete proof of the Marginal Mechanism and Core De-
composition lemmas that apply to many bidders. The statements are essentially the
same, but require more extensive notation which we develop in the next subsection.
The main technical challenge is extending Lemma 3.4 to many buyers; recall that
this is the lemma that lower bounds the revenue from a distribution D+ of additive-
across-a-partition valuations, in terms of the revenue from the original distribution D
and the expected difference δ betweenD and D+. I.e. given a black-box mechanism for
D, we would like to create a new mechanism for D+. How can we preserve incentive
compatibility when the buyers have different incentives? In Section 3.1 we do this for
a single buyer by giving the buyer the outcome (allocation and price), of the possible
outcomes for all types in the original mechanism, which is optimal for her new val-
uation. Incentive compatibility is now guaranteed, and we simply need to bound the
revenue.
When multiple buyers are involved there is a problem with this approach: incentive
compatibility of any buyer depends also on the distribution of types reported by other
buyers; thus we cannot simply let any buyer report any type she wants. To overcome
this challenge, we use a technique due to [Bei and Huang 2011; Hartline et al. 2011;
Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012] which guarantees that each buyer observes the cor-
rect distribution of types on the other buyers. For buyer i, we sample an additional
r−1 replica types fromD+i , and r surrogate types fromDi. Given the real buyer’s type,
we create (in an incentive compatible manner) a complete matching between replicas
and surrogates. Since the real buyer’s type is sampled from the same distribution as
the replicas, she is equally likely to be matched to any of the surrogates. Thus the dis-
tribution over the surrogate type that is matched to the buyer i is exactly the original
distribution Di; i.e. all other buyers observe the “correct” distribution. The mechanism
is now Bayesian incentive compatible, and further analysis shows that the lower bound
on the revenue is preserved.
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5.1. Notation and statement
There are m bidders and n items. We now say that an item i is in the tail if there
is any buyer who values item i above the core-tail cutoff, and item i is in the core if
every buyer values it below the cutoff. D is now the joint distribution of all buyers
valuation functions. We study Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanisms (and
η-BIC mechanisms). A mechanism is BIC if it is in every buyer’s best interest to report
truthfully, conditioned on other buyers reporting truthfully as well (and η-BIC if this
holds up to an additive η). Formally, let φj(v) denote the (random) allocation awarded
to bidder j when reporting type v; we slightly abuse notation by letting v (φ) denote
the expected utility, over any randomness in the mechanism and the other bidders
sampling their types, that a bidder with type v gains from a random allocation φ;
let pj(v) denote the expected price paid by bidder j when reporting type v over the
same randomness. Finally, a mechanism is BIC iff for all j, v, v′, v(φj(v)) − pj(v) ≥
v(φj(v
′)) − pj(v′). Let η(·) denote the additive function that satisfies η(S) = η · |S|
(that is, the function has value η per item). A mechanism is η-BIC iff for all j, v, v′,
v(φj(v)) − pj(v) + η(φj(v)) ≥ v(φj(v′))− pj(v′). We use the following notation.
—Dj : The distribution of vj(·), the valuation function for bidder j. We assume that D
is a product distribution. That is, D = ×jDj.
—DA: the distribution D, conditioned on A being exactly the set of items in the tail.
—DTA: the distribution DA restricted just to items in the tail (i.e. A).
—DCA : the distribution DA restricted just to items in the core (i.e. A¯).
— pi: the probability that element i is in the tail.
— pA: the probability that A is exactly the set of items in the tail (note that p{i} 6= pi).
— REV (D): The maximum revenue obtainable via a BIC mechanism from buyers with
valuation profile drawn from D.
— VAL (D)=Ev←D
[
maxS1⊔...⊔Sm{
∑
j vj(Sj)}
]
: the expected welfare of the VCG mecha-
nism when buyers are drawn from D.
— REVM (D): The revenue of a mechanism M when buyers drawn from D play truth-
fully.
We are finally ready to state the approximate core decomposition lemma for many
buyers:
LEMMA 5.1. For any distribution D = ×jDj with each Dj subadditive over inde-
pendent items, and any 0 < ǫ < 1,
REV(D) ≤
(
1
ǫ
+
1
1− ǫ
)
VAL(DC∅ ) +
1
1− ǫ
∑
S⊆[n]
pAREV(D
T
A)
PROOF. Follows from Theorem 5.2 below, together with the arguments used in Sec-
tion 3.1 and in [Babaioff et al. 2014].
5.2. The mechanism
First, we describe the reduction we will use (which is essentially the same as the ǫ-BIC
to BIC reduction used in [Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012], but without some technical
hardships since we aren’t concerned with runtime - our proof never actually runs this
procedure). Below, D+ denotes any product distribution that first-order stochastically
dominates D, and δj(·) denotes the random function v+j (·)− vj(·) when couples v+ and
v are sampled jointly from D+ and D. Note that δj(S) ≥ 0 for all δj , S. We will also
abuse notation and refer to δj as the distribution over δj(·) as well (so we can write
terms like VAL(δ)).
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Phase 1, Surrogate Sale:
(1) Let M be any η-BIC mechanism for buyers from D. Multiply all prices charged by
M by (1−ǫ) and call the newmechanismM ǫ. Interpret the ǫ fraction of prices given
back as rebates.
(2) For each bidder j, create r − 1 replicas sampled i.i.d. from D+j and r surrogates
sampled i.i.d. from Dj . Let r→∞.
(3) Ask each bidder to report vj(·).
(4) Create a weighted bipartite graph with replicas (and bidder j) on the left and sur-
rogates on the right. The weight of an edge between a replica (or bidder j) with
type rj(·) and surrogate of type sj(·), is the utility of rj for the expected outcome of
M ǫ when reporting sj . That is, the weight of the edge is rj(φ
ǫ
j(sj))− pǫj(sj).
(5) Compute a maximum matching and VCG prices in this bipartite graph; we hence-
forth refer to it as the VCG matching. If a replica (or bidder j) is unmatched in the
VCG matching, add an edge to a random unmatched surrogate. (Notice that some
replicas may indeed be unmatched if the gain negative utility from the allocation
and prices corresponding to some surrogates.) The surrogate selected for bidder j
is whomever she is matched to.
Phase 2, Surrogate Competition:
(1) Let sj denote the surrogate chosen to represent bidder j in phase one, and let ~s
denote the entire surrogate profile (i.e. the ones matched to the real buyers). Have
the surrogates playM ǫ.
(2) If bidder j was matched to her surrogate through VCG, charge them the VCG price
and award themM ǫj (~s). Recall that this has an allocation and price component; the
price is added onto the VCG price. If bidder j was matched to a random surrogate
after VCG, award them nothing and charge them nothing.
THEOREM 5.2. Let M ′ denote the mechanism of the process above, starting from
any η-BIC mechanismM for consumers drawn from D. ThenM ′ is BIC for consumers
drawn from D+. Furthermore, for any desired ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we can have: REVM ′(D+) ≥
(1− ǫ) · (REVM (D)− VAL(δ)/ǫ − nη/ǫ).
In the theorem statement above, note that by VAL(δ), we mean the expected welfare
of the VCG mechanism when buyers with types distributed according to δ = ×jδj play,
and recall that n is the number of items.
5.3. Proof outline
The reduction is nearly identical to the reduction employed
in [Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012] (which is itself inspired by [Bei and Huang
2011; Hartline et al. 2011]). We provide complete proofs of all claims for complete-
ness, noting that many of these claims can also be found in [Bei and Huang 2011;
Hartline et al. 2011; Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012]. We provide appropriate citations
by each statement. Below is the proof outline, taken from [Daskalakis and Weinberg
2012].
(1) If bidder j playsM ′ truthfully, then the distribution of surrogates matched to bid-
der j isDj . Therefore, the value of each edge is calculated correctly as the expected
utility of a replica with type r for being represented by a surrogate of type s inM ǫ.
(2) Because each bidder is participating in a VCG auction for their surrogate, and the
value of each edge is calculated correctly, whenever all other bidders tell the truth,
it is in bidder j’s interest to tell the truth as well. Therefore,M ′ is BIC.
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(3) The revenue made from bidder j is at least the price paid by their surrogate if
bidder j is matched in VCG, and 0 otherwise.
(4) There exists a near-perfect matching that matches each replica to a nearly-
identical surrogate (modulo δj(·)). If VCG used this matching, we would have
REVM
′
(D) = (1− ǫ)REVM (D).
(5) The rebates allow us to bound the revenue lost by selecting the VCG matching
instead of this near-perfect matching as a function of VAL(δ), η, and ǫ.
We proceed to state the formal claims associated with steps 1 through 5.
Step 1: The surrogate distributions
LEMMA 5.3. ([Hartline et al. 2011]) If bidder j plays M ′ truthfully, then the distri-
bution of the surrogate selected for bidder j is exactly Dj .
PROOF. Imagine sampling replicas and surrogates for bidder j in the following way
instead. First, sample the r types for the left-hand side of the bipartite graph i.i.d. from
D+j and the r types for the right-hand side i.i.d. from Dj . Then, find the max-weight
matching between types, completing it by randomly adding edges from unmatched
nodes on the left to unmatched nodes on the right to form a perfect matching. Then,
declare all of the r right-hand types surrogates, randomly select one of the left-hand
types to be bidder j, and declare the remaining r − 1 as replicas. Note that sampling
in this order yields the correct distribution of replicas, surrogates, and bidder j, as
long as bidder j reports truthfully. Furthermore, it is clear now that the distribution
of the surrogate selected for bidder j after sampling in this order is exactly Dj : once
the matching is fixed, we simply pick a random left-hand type and output its partner.
So essentially we are drawing r i.i.d. samples from Dj and selecting one at random.
Clearly this is the same distribution as Dj.
Step 2: Bayesian incentive compatibility
COROLLARY 5.4. ([Hartline et al. 2011])M ′ is BIC.
PROOF. Fix any bidder j and assume all others report truthfully. By Lemma 5.3,
the distribution of all other surrogates matches D−j exactly, so the weight of the edge
between each replica (and bidder j) and each surrogate correctly computes the value
of that replica for being represented by that surrogate in M . As bidder j is just par-
ticipating in a truthful VCG mechanism against the replicas for the surrogates, and
all values are computed correctly (conditioned on other buyers telling the truth),M ′ is
BIC.
Step 3: A good matching implies high revenue
PROPOSITION 5.5. ([Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012]) Conditioning on right-hand
types (surrogates) {sk}k∈[r] and left-hand types (replicas plus bidder j) {rk}k∈[r], the
expected payment of bidder j is at least∑
k s.t. sk is matched in VCG
pǫj(sk)/r.
PROOF. Conditioned on the left and right-hand types being sampled, but having
not yet decided which left-hand type is bidder j, the surrogate matched to bidder j is
just a random surrogate. So each surrogate sk is matched to bidder j with probability
1/r. Furthermore, bidder j will pay the price pǫj(sk) whenever his matched surrogate
was selected by VCG (and not the random edges afterwards). Therefore, bidder j pays
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at least
∑
{k|sk is matched in VCG} p
ǫ
j(sk)/r. The reason this is not tight is because it
does not count the additional payments of the VCG mechanism.
Step 4: Existence of a near-perfect matching. Our next goal is to show that there exists
a near-perfect matching that only matches replicas and surrogates that are “close.”
For any γ > 0 and two types v and v′ drawn from Dj , we say that v and v
′ are γ-
equivalent if for all S ⊆ [n], there exists an integer z(S) such that {v(S), v′(S)} ⊆
[(1 + γ)z(S), (1 + γ)z(S)+1). It’s easy to see that this defines an equivalence relation. For
a type rj drawn fromD
+
j , let r
′
j denote it’s couple drawn fromDj . We say that two types
drawn from D+j are γ-equivalent if their couples are γ-equivalent, and that rj drawn
fromD+j is γ-equivalent to sj drawn fromDj if r
′
j and sj are γ-equivalent (basically we
are putting replicas in equivalence classes based on their couples).
The following lemma from [Hartline et al. 2011] bounds the number of unmatched
surrogates:
LEMMA 5.6. (Lemma 3.7 in [Hartline et al. 2011]) The expected number of un-
matched surrogates in a maximal matching that only matches equivalent replicas and
surrogates when types are split into at most β possible equivalence classes is at most
O
(√
βr
)
.
In the next lemma we use Lemma 5.6 to lower-bound the revenue obtained from the
matched replicas.
LEMMA 5.7. (Implicit in [Hartline et al. 2011]) For any γ > 0, letW denote anymax-
imal matching of replicas to surrogates (for all bidders) that only matches γ-equivalent
types. Then as r →∞, we get E[∑j∑{k|sjk is matched inW} pǫj(sjk)] ≥ (1− γ)REV(M ǫ).
PROOF. At a high level, the proof is straightforward: for a fixed equivalence class,
the distribution of the number of replicas and surrogates in that class is the same. So
as we take more and more i.i.d. samples, the number of each concentrates very tightly
around its expectation, so not many types are unmatched. Showing this formally is
somewhat technical.
Let’s focus on a specific equivalence class C for a fixed bidder j. There is some proba-
bility qC that a type drawn fromDj lands in class C. Let REV
q(M ǫ) denote the revenue
obtained by M ǫ only counting payments by types in an equivalence class C such that
qC ≥ q and v([n]) ≤ 1/q for all v ∈ C. It’s clear that limq→0 REVq(M ǫ) = REV(M ǫ), as
the revenue obtained from equivalence classes with qC = 0 is exactly 0 and the rev-
enue obtained from all other equivalence classes is eventually counted for sufficiently
small q. So we can pick a q > 0 such that REVq(M ǫ) ≥ (1 − γ/2)REV(M ǫ). Note now
that there can only be finitely many equivalence classes counted towards REVq(M ǫ)
(in particular, at most 1/q per bidder), and that the maximum payment by a type in
any such equivalence class is at most 1/q (by individual rationality).
So now the probability that a surrogate or replica is sampled to be in a counted
equivalence class is at least q (there must be at least one such equivalence class) and
there are at most 1/q equivalence classes. So we may apply Lemma 5.6 to see that for a
single bidder, the expected number of unmatched surrogates from equivalence classes
that count is at most O
(√
r/q
)
. As each such surrogate pays at most 1/q, the total
revenue lost in expectation from unmatched surrogates in equivalence classes that
count is at most O
(
1/
√
rq3
)
(due to Proposition 5.5). Summing up across all bidders,
the revenue lost is at most O
(
m/
√
rq3
)
. In addition, the total revenue lost in expec-
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tation from unmatched surrogates across all bidders from equivalence classes that
didn’t count is clearly at most (γ/2)REV(M ǫ) by choice of q. So the total revenue lost
from unmatched surrogates in this matching is at most (γ/2)REV(M ǫ) +O
(
m/
√
rq3
)
.
As r →∞, the second term approaches zero, completing the proof.
Step 5: The VCG matching is almost as good . Combining Proposition 5.5 and Lemma 5.7
says the following: if only this nearly-perfect matching was the one selected by VCG,
then we would know that REVM
′
(D) was good. But for all we know, VCGmay choose to
leave many surrogates unmatched if it helps improve the welfare of the replicas. The
key is to show that not many surrogates can be unmatched, due to the rebates.
Let V denote the VCG matching and W denote the matching guaranteed by
Lemma 5.7. Then there is a disjoint set of augmenting paths and cycles that transform
W into V . As V is a max-weight matching, all of these augmenting paths and cycles
must have non-negative weight. It is easy to see that augmenting cycles do not change
the set of matched surrogates, and therefore do not affect the revenue. We therefore
want to study augmenting paths that unmatch a surrogate.
If an augmenting path unmatches sjk, then no replica is receiving the rebate
awarded to sjk any more. Because VCG is choosing the max-weight matching, it must
be the case that the benefit of switching every other edge along the path outweighs
the cost of losing the rebate awarded to sjk. This is where we make use of the fact
that each replica is matched to a surrogate that is nearly identical to them, except for
an additive δjk(·). Because M is η-BIC, we can bound the expected gain of switching
a replica who is matched to a nearly identical surrogate to any other surrogate using
δ(·) and η(·). Therefore, each surrogate that gets unmatched by an augmenting path
“claims” many replicas to be in its augmenting path. The argument shows that in fact
it takes several replicas to make a positive weight augmenting path, and therefore not
many surrogates can be unmatched.
LEMMA 5.8. (Ideas from [Daskalakis and Weinberg 2012]) If Uj denotes the set of
surrogates that are matched in W but not V , and Tj denotes the set of surrogates
matched in V but not W , (for bidder j), then E[ 1r
∑
j
∑
s∈Uj
pj(s) −
∑
s∈Tj
pj(s)] ≤
VAL(δ)/ǫ+mη/ǫ.
PROOF. Consider any augmenting path that unmatches a surrogate s in W and
(possibly) matches a new surrogate s′. For simplicity of notation, if no new surrogate is
matched, we let s′ denote a null type that receives no items and pays no price toM . We
break the contribution of edges in this path into two parts, the first coming just from
the rebates awarded to the surrogates and the second coming from the allocation and
original price paid. It is easy to see that the contribution of rebates to the weight of
the augmenting path is exactly ǫpj(s)− ǫpj(s′). Now we analyze the weight of the path
coming from the second part. We can compute the weight by summing over all replicas
rj in the path of their utility for their new surrogate minus their utility for their old
surrogate. Note that any augmenting path that unmatches a surrogate cannot possibly
add an edge to a replica who was unmatched in W . Since M is η-BIC, for any replica
rj that was matched to sj inW and moved to s
′
j in V , we have:
sj(φj(sj))− pj(sj) + η(φj(sj)) ≥ sj(φj(s′j))− pj(sj)
Using the fact that rj and sj are γ-equivalent (note that γ-equivalence implies that
(1 + γ)rj(S) ≥ sj(S) ≥ (1− γ)rj(S)− δj(S) for all S), we get:
(1 + γ)rj(φj(sj))− pj(sj) + η(φj(sj)) ≥ (1− γ)rj(φj(s′j))− δj(φj(s′j))− pj(sj)
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And rearranging terms yields:
rj(φj(s
′
j))−pj(sj)− rj(φj(sj))+pj(sj) ≤ γrj(φj(sj))+γrj(φj(s′j))+ δj(φj(s′j))+η(φj(sj))
Note that the left-hand side is exactly the increase in utility as we move rj from sj
to s′j . So now we know that the total increase in utility from moving all replicas across
all bidders must outweigh the total decrease caused by unmatching surrogates. We
therefore get:
E[
ǫ
r
∑
j
∑
s∈Uj
pj(s)−
∑
s∈Tj
pj(s)] ≤ E[ 1
r
∑
j
∑
rj
γrj(φj(sj))+γrj(φj(s
′
j))+δj(φj(s
′
j))+η(φj(sj))]
Consider now the following allocation algorithm (not a mechanism, and certainly not
truthful). When bidder j reports rj , the algorithm selects the allocation output by M
on input (s1, . . . , sm). This is clearly a feasible allocation algorithm, and it’s also clear
that the term E[ 1r
∑
j
∑
rj
rj(φj(sj))] exactly computes the expected welfare achieved by
this algorithm when the type of buyer j is drawn from Dj . We can similarly define an
allocation algorithm that replaces rj with s
′
j , and one that samples δj ← D+j −Dj and
replaces δj with s
′
j (and ditto for η). Now that we have concrete allocation algorithms
that match the terms on the right-hand side exactly, we can bound it as:
E[
1
r
∑
j
∑
rj
γrj(φj(sj)) + γrj(φj(s
′
j)) + δj(φj(s
′
j))] ≤ 2γVAL(D) + VAL(δ) + VAL(η)
Observe, however, that in η(·) every bidder values every item at η, so VAL(η) = η · n
(n is the number of items). Lastly, because this claim holds for all γ > 0, we may let
γ → 0 and the right-hand bound becomes just VAL(δ) + ηn. Some care must be taken
if VAL(D) = ∞, but similar tricks to those used in the proof of Lemma 5.7 suffice.
Essentially, one can take an increasing limit of truncations of D, calling them DC
(the same distribution D but replacing v(·) with the 0-function if v([n]) > C). Clearly
all VAL(DC) is finite for all C, and clearly limC→∞ REV
M (DC) = REVM (D) for any
mechanism M . So one can use the above analysis on the bounded distributions DC
and take a limit.
With the lemma above, our proof is complete. There is a high-cardinality matching W
that provides revenue exactly REVM (D), if only it were chosen by VCG. But VCG may
choose a different matching, and we may lose some revenue. The lemma bounds how
much revenue can be lost, and provides the bound in the theorem.
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